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The Role of Military 
Expenditures in the 
African Economic Crisis 
ROBERT E. LOONEY 
The period 1970-1982 in Africa was marked by poor economic 
perfonnance, and also by accelerated military expenditures. In 
seeking to detennine whether these two phenomena were linked, 
this analysis finds that although generalizations concerning the 
Third World in this regard are futile, for many African countries 
the defense build-up of the 1970s and early '80s was a major factor 
in their economic demise. 
INTRODUCTION 
The poor economic performance in Africa during the 1970s and 
'80s has spawned a rather vigorous debate1 over where to lay the 
blame for the region's economic crisis. The major contributors to 
this debate have tended to structure their arguments around the 
issue of whether the principal cause of the poor performance was 
outside the control of governments in Africa (the poor state of the 
world economy and associated declines in commodity prices, 
drought, and so on) or whether it was due to adverse selection 
policies on key issues by government (acceleration in military 
expenditures, discrimination against agriculture in pricing, and 
the attempt to maintain balance of payments equilibrium by 
reliance on direct controls). 
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With respect to military expenditures, allocations to de-
fense, despite lagging economic growth, rose rapidly in the early 
1970s, reaching a peak in 1976-77 when they were approximately 
double their 1970 level (in constant prices).2 The rise was sharpest 
in North Africa, owing in part to its proximity to the Middle East. 
Yet there were also smaller rises in sub-Saharan Africa, whose 
military spending increased by more than one-half in the first 
five years of the decade. 
The effects of military spending on economic performance-
and in particular whether increased spending in the 1960s and 
'70s bears any responsibility for the economic crisis that has beset 
the region-are extremely difficult to deterrnine.3 Superficial 
reading of the evidence (Table 1) would seem to suggest that 
militaryexpenditureshave,ifanything,risenfasterinthemiddle-
income and higher-growth economies and that they have risen 
more slowly or have declined in poorer, low-growth economies. 
However, this may merely be because, in many of the former, the 
factors that account for nonmilitary growth-including rapid 
rises in earnings from the international economy by oil and other 
mineral producers-have also generated higher military spend-
ing, whereas in the lowest-growth economies military spending 
has fallen because of rapid inflation and shrinking government 
revenues.4 
My purpose here is to shed more light on the effect of 
military expenditures during their period of acceleration (1970-
1982) on economic performance in Africa. The specific purpose 
of the empirical work below is to determine whether military 
expenditures5 during this period can be directly linked to poor 
socioeconomic performance in the region and, if so, in what 
situations this was most likely to have occurred. 
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Source: R. Luckham, "Militarization in Africa," in SIPRI, WorldAnnaments and Disannament, 1985 
(Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis, 1985), p. 298. 
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Contrary to the conventional wisdom6 associated with the guns 
vs. butter analogies, recent empirical research on Third World 
economies suggests that under certain circumstances increased 
levels of defense expenditures can enhance economic growth. 
First, Benoit,7 Faini, Annez, and Taylor,8 and Looney,9 among 
others, have shown that defense spending may stimulate growth 
by increasing aggregate demand. The additional demand gener-
ated by higher defense spending leads to increased utilization of 
capital stock, lower resource costs, and higher labor employ-
ment. The mechanism here is straightforward: higher defense 
spending leads to increased utilization of capital stock, lower 
resource costs, and higher labor employment. The increased 
utilization of capital stock may lead in turn to an increase in the 
profit rate. Increased profits may, then, lead to higher invest-
ment, which, in turn, will generate both short-run multiplier 
effects as well as higher long-term rates of economic growth. In 
this case, defense spending appears to be causally prior to eco-
nomic growth.10 
Another variant of this mechanism operates through the 
security aspect of defense expenditures. As Koler11 has recently 
shown, a well-equipped and well-trained army in the African 
context can induce additional investment and (ultimately) growth 
through its security-enhancing effects. 
Second, the work of Deger12 suggests that defense spending 
may aid economic development through a spin-off effect. In the 
LDCs, the military is undoubtedly one of the most modern 
institutions and thus may help in creating a socioeconomic struc-
ture conducive to growth. The military may aid in enhancing 
growth through engaging in R&D, providing technical skills and 
educational training, and creating productive infrastructure. 
Finally, several studies13 have found that by disaggregating 
developing countries into categories such as resource rich and 
resource poor or foreign exchange constrained and unconstrained, 
it is possible to identify a number of positive economic impacts 
associated with defense expenditures. On the other hand, 
resource-constrained, foreign exchange poor nations tend to 
have a negative impact on growth. Although during periods of 
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austerity high opportunity costs might indicate that defense cuts 
could be appropriate, for this group of countries it is usually 
development projects that are reduced. The reasons are very 
simple: military expenditures are current outlays (not including 
arms bought on credit) whereas development projects are future 
growths, and there is a natural tendency to try to maintain the 
status quo. As a result, military budgets in resource-constrained 
countries are often not significantly reduced during periods of 
austerity.14 
Perhaps offsetting this effect is Weed's finding that in-
creased military participation rates increase overall economic 
growth.15 Clearly Africa, given its very low levels of human 
capital formation, should be one of the most receptive areas for 
this link between military expenditure, military participation, 
human capital formation, and hence economic growth. It is also 
clear, however, that those African countries facing strong exter-
nal or internal threats will be forced to allocate a relatively large 
proportion of their military resources to equipment and im-
ported arms and supplies16 and will not be in a particularly good 
position to fully use the military as a medium for increasing 
human capital. 
In sum, two conflicting forces may be at work in Africa. On 
the one hand, countries with low internal and external threat are 
in a position, if they have the resources, to utilize the military in 
a manner that is quite likely to improve growth. On the other 
hand, countries with high external or internal threats to security 
may be forced to divert resources from productive areas into 
equipment and related expenditure unlikely to improve overall 
growth. The relative magnitudes of these opposing forces will 
undoubtedly determine the impact military expenditures have 
on the economy. These observations are the basis for a model of 
military expenditure and economic development elaborated in 
the next section. 
THREAT PERCEPTION, RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS, 
AND LEGITIMACY 
One approach to explaining the .linkage between military expen-
ditures and economic performance is to examine the role of the 
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state in the African context. Although the state takes many forms 
in Africa,17 in almost all cases it has great power and autonomy 
because of its central role in providing security and instituting 
and managing the process of economic and social development. 
The functions that the state performs in the poor, weak, and 
badly integrated countries of Africa are particularly critical. The 
state must meet the growing demand for certain public goods 
(security, infrastructure, education, and the like) and for certain 
kinds of large-scale organization and central guidance.18 
Furthermore, in many of the African countries the state faces 
a substantial resource gap. Maintaining an equilibrium between 
rising demands and available resources is becoming increasingly 
difficult. The absence of resources sharply narrows the range of 
elite choices and makes repression and higher military spending 
more likely, but it also has an impact on the legitimacy of the 
state.19 Legitimacy relates to whether citizens are loyal and will-
ingly support state policies-whether they accept the authority 
of the state and believe existing institutions are in some sense 
appropriate. In general, illegitimate governments must use much 
of the resources they dispose of to stay in power and to secure 
compliance; conversely, legitimate governments can expend 
more available resources on productive public goods.20 
Along these lines, Rothstein has constructed a framework 
whereby the relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy 
is an important element in explaining 'the level of military expen-
diture.21 Operationally, both variables, effectiveness and legiti-
macy, are difficult to estimate and require some degree of subjec-
tive judgment by analysts. The same is also true for the degree of 
threat (external or internal) perceived by ruling elites. After 
consulting with various authorities, Rothstein constructed a 
matrix capable of classifying developing countries on the basis of 
government legitimacy and degree of threat.22 
An examination of Rothstein's group of African countries23 
indicates an even simpler classification. In general, those African 
countries that experience low legitimacy also tend to experience 
a high level of threat. On the other hand, those countries experi-
encing medium to high levels of legitimacy tend to experience 
low levels of threat. Although there are several exceptions to this 
general pattern, it was felt that in part Rotpstein's classification 
scheme approaches a tautology: if legitimacy is dependent on 
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performance, then those countries with some resource availabil-
ity (performance) may also be legitirnate.24 
To avoid this problem a simple two-group sample was 
developed. This classification scheme follows Rothstein, but 
focuses on countries of similar military orientation-develop-
mental and repressive; i.e., conflict countries were defined as 
countries of low governmental effectiveness and nonconflict 
countries were defined as having medium to high levels of 
government effectiveness and/or low threat. 
On this basis, the countries classified as nonconflict were: 
Cameroon, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, Morocco, Rwanda, Malawi, 
Benin, Algeria, Libya, Ivory Coast, Congo, Sierra Leone, Tanza-
nia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Kenya. Those classified as 
conflict were: Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia, Niger, Upper Volta, Libe-
ria, Mauritania, Chad, Madagascar, Uganda, Ethiopia, Central 
African Republic, Angola, Mozambique, Zaire, and Guinea. 
An examination of socioeconomic and military differences 
between the two groups tends to verify (Table 2) the general 
picture sketched above, i.e., the nonconflict countries have con-
sistently superior socioeconomic performance. These patterns 
are nearly constant across a wide variety of indices. 
In contrast, the conflict countries have a higher military 
burden (measured as a share of GNP). However, the nonconflict 
countries have higher total and per capita military expenditures. 
The external sectors 'Of conflict and nonconflict states also 
vary considerably. Although the conflict states had somewhat 
better export performance in the 1960s, their ability to import was 
way below that of the nonconflict countries over the 1970-1982 
period. 
In part, the superior import performance of the nonconflict 
states was due to their relative ability to borrow externally. Both 
measures of external public debt-the total volume and the 
servicing of the debt-indicate the relative ability of the noncon-
flict countries to attract external loans (Table 2). In short, the 
conflict and nonconflict countries are characterized by consider-
able differences across a wide variety of indices. 
If the conceptualized framework developed above is correct, 
we should expect to find a generally favorable association be-
tween military expenditures and the quality of life, economic 
activity, and resources for development in the nonconflict states, 
with the reverse occurring for the conflict countries in Africa. 
TABLE2 
Socioeconomic Comparisons of African Regimes 
(means) 
Regime type 
Variables Conflict Nonconf. 
Economic variables 
Per capita income, 1982 332.1 1,148.6 
Marginal savings rate, 1970-81 -1.7 10.3 
Capital output ratio, 1970-82 -1.8 1.6 
Share of investment in GDP, 1982 17.3 24.9 
Growth of GDP, 1970-82 1.9 4.2 
% public consumption in GDP, 1982 17.5 17.7 
% public expenditures in GDP, 1981 21.1 28.8 
% public revenues in GDP, 1981 15.9 22.5 
% private consumption in GDP, 1982 81.6 71.3 
Growth in investment, 1970-82 1.7 6.7 
Growth in public consumption, 1970-82 3.6 7.6 
Socioeconomic variables 
% of population with safe water, 1980 22.1 41.0 
Protein supply per capita, 1980 53.6 172.0 
Calorie supply per capita, 1980 2,103.9 2,220.7 
Life expectancy, 1980 44.5 52.8 
Infant mortality rate, 1980 138.6 134.3 
Population per physician, 1980 27,731.9 14,192.1 
Public health expend. per cap., 1980 4.2 18.9 
Literacy rate, 1980 25.3 44.4 
% women in university enrollmen~ 1980 20.6 21.7 
% school-age population per teacher, 1980 30.2 47.9 
School-age population per teacher, 1980 182.8 91.3 
Exports-imports-public external debt 
Growth in exports, 1970-82 -1.3 -1.1 
Growth in imports, 1960-70 10.0 8.9 
Growth in imports, 1970-82 0.1 3.3 
Growth in imports, 1960-70 5.6 5.9 
Public external debt, 1970 149.6 260.2 
Public external debt, 1982 1,675.5 2,316.1 
Debt service as % of GDP, 1982 2.6 4.1 
Debt service as % of exports, 1970 4.9 5.8 
Debt service as % of exports, 1982 8.5 15.8 
Military variables 
Total military expenditures, 1981 260.4 372.5 
Military expenditures,$ GNP, 1981 3.9 3.4 
Military expenditures per capita, 1980 14.1 23.0 
Military expend. per soldier, 1980 7,002.4 1,284.9 
Sources: R. L. Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, 1983 (Washington: World Priorities, 
1983); World Bank, World Development Report 1984 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
84 Military Expenditures in the African Economic Crisis 
Note that this conceptual framework extends the previous 
work of Looney and Frederiksen25 through explicitly incorporat-
ing the motives for defense expenditure and regime type with 
their simple dichotomy between resource/foreign-exchange-
abundant and scarce economies. In the African context of general 
resource scarcity, it is apparent that the correct dichotomy is 
between those countries able to free up some resources for 
development and those that are unable. Whether a country 
makes resources available for development is largely a function 
of legitimacy. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The main quality of life measures26 were derived from a maxi-
mum likelihood factor analysis27 of fourteen standard socioeco-
nomic indices. The results (Table 3) of the factor analysis for the 
total sample of African countries indicate that four main trends 
exist in the data; i.e, that the fourteen socioeconomic measures of 
development represent four major independent developmental 
phenomena. The first phenomenon, Factor l, represents the 
general development of human capital, and Factor 2 depicts the 
level of public expenditure per capita; Factor 3 nutritional levels, 
and Factor 4 educational levels among women. 
Interestingly enough; when factor analysis was performed 
on the conflict and nonconflict countries, marked differences in 
the factor patterns were discovered (Tables 4, 5). The conflict 
states followed more or less the same factor pattern as the sample 
as a whole. However, for the nonconflict countries the factor de-
picting public expenditure per capita (Factor 1) accounted for the 
largest proportion of the sample variance. Nutrition accounted 
for the next higher proportion of variance, followed by general 
human capital and a fourth factor depicting the number of 
professionals (physicians and teachers) per capita. 
The next step in the analysis was to determine through 
regression analysis the general impact of military expenditures 
on the four general measures of the quality of life derived above. 
To improve the specification of the regressions, per capita in-
come (GNPPER) was introduced as a control variable. Military 
expenditures were introduced as the military burden-the share 
of military expenditures in GNP (MILX). 
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The results28 (Table 6) for the general development of human 
capital indicate a negative relationship between the military 
burden and human capital development. On the other hand, a 
positive and statistically significant relationship existed between 
human capital development and the military burden in the 
nonconflict states. No statistically significant relationship was 
found in the case of the conflict states, however. 
Although the total sample of countries experienced a highly 
significant correlation between the military burden and public 
expenditures per capita on health and education, the nonconflict 
states also experienced positive and highly significant links 
between the military burden and other types of public expendi-
ture (health and education) per capita. 
TABLE3 
Oblique Factor Rotation: 
Dimensions of African Quality of Life 
(standardized regression coefficients) 
Socioeconomic Factor 
variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Infant mortality rate 0.90' 0.19 -0.29 0.14 
School-age population 
per teacher 0.76' 0.00 0.18 -0.29 
Population per 
hospital bed 0.68' -0.05 0.20 -0.20 
Population per physician 0.57' 0.05 0.00 -0.51 
Life expectancy -0.61' 0.02 0.34 0.11 
% school-age 
population in school -0.71' 0.31 -0.09 0.03 
Literacy rate -0.94' 0.05 0.00 -0.26 
Per capita income 0.02 1.01' 0.04 -0.05 
Public health 
expenditure per capita -0.03 0.99' 0.02 -0.07 
Public educational 
expenditure per capita -0.02 0.95' 0.05 -0.01 
Protein supply per capita 0.27 0.11 0.82' 0.16 
% population with 
safe water -0.23 0.08 0.73' 0.07 
% women in total 
university enrollment 0.02 -0.01 0.23 0.62' 
• Indicates high correlation with respective factor. 
TABLE4 
Oblique Factor Rotation: 
Dimensions of Quality of Life in African Conflict States 
(standardized regression coefficients) 
Socioeconomic Factor ~ 
variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor4 
Infant mortality rate 0.99* 0.35 -0.20 -0.13 
School-age population 
per teacher 0.63* -0.33 0.11 -0.04 
Population per 
hospital bed 0.61* -0.06 0.18 -0.10 
Population per 
physician 0.57* -0.45 -0.26 -0.06 
% school-age 
population in school -0.48* 0.31 -0.23 0.26 
Life expectancy -0.63* 0.37 0.00 -0.29 
Literacy rate -0.92* -0.11 -0.18 -0.12 
Public educational 
expenditure per capita 0.11 1.01 ·o.oo 0.00 
Per capita income 0.13 0.82* -0.07 0.20 
Calories per capita -0.23 0.57* 0.44 0.14 
% population with 
safe water -0.07 0.08 0.86* -0.04 
Protein supply 
per capita 0.30 -0.06 0.78* 0.06 
% women in total 
university enrollment O.o? 0.13 0.10 0.79* 
Public health 
expenditure per capita -0.02 0.37 -0.21 0.58* 
• Indicates high correlation with respective factor. 
~ 
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TABLES 
Oblique Factor Rotation: Dimensions of Quality of Life 
in African Nonconflict States 
(standardized regression coefficients) 
Socioeconomic Factor 
variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Per capita income 0.96. 0.03 0.05 0.00 
Public health 
expenditure per capita 0.94. 0.00 0.10 -0.02 
Public educational 
expenditure per capita 0.91· 0.04 0.01 -0.10 
% women in total 
university enrollment -0.11 o.89. -0.08 -0.12 
Protein supply per capita 0.25 o.89. -0.07 0.23 
% population with 
safe water 0.09 0.74. 0.28 0.06 
Life expectancy -0.10 o.59. 0.23 -0.37 
Calories per capita -0.55 o.5r -0.19 -0.05 
Literacy rate 0.02 -0.09 0.97° 0.07 
% school-age 
population in school 0.33 -0.07 o.5r -0.23 
Infant mortality rate 0.24 -0.26 -0.61· 0.29 
Population per 
hospital bed -0.19• -0.01 -0.86. -0.47 
Population per physician -0.07 0.00 0.16 0.94. 
School-age population 
per teacher -0.W 0.10 -0.18 0.82· 
• Indicates high correlation with respective factor. 
To test this hypothesis, the share of defense in the central 
government budget was regressed on the share going to each of 
the other major socioeconomic budgetary categories. Again, 
several control variables were introduced to improve the regres-
sion specifications.29 These included:30 (a) per capita income 
(GNPPER); (b) the share of public consumption in GDP (PCB), 
and the share of public external debt in GDP (DEBT). Only the 
most statistically significant results for GNPPER, PCB, or DEBT 
are shown here. 
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In general, the results (Tables 7, 8, and 9) indicate that: 
1. The nonconflict states experience a number of positive 
linkages between defense and socioeconomic expenditures--
public services, education, health, social security, roads and 
other transport. In each case, defense showed a high degree of 
statistical significance. 
2. The only statistically significant negative trade-off in the 
nonconflict countries associated with defense was expenditures 
on agriculture. For the conflict countries, in sharp contrast, only 
one socioeconomic allocation, housing, had a positive and sig-
nificant association with defense. 
3. Increased defense allocations in the conflict countries 
tended to reduce public services, economic services, and roads. 
Other categories such as education, health, other social, agricul-
ture, and other economic purposes had a negative trade-off rela-
tionship with defense, but were not statistically significant. 
4. Again, the total sample of countries (Table 7) tends to 
reflect the patterns found in nonconflict countries rather than in 
the conflict states. 
In short, the results obtained in the analysis of budgetary 
trade-offs are quite consistent with the quality of life findings and 
perhaps provide insights as to the way in which increased de-
fense expenditures tend to improve the general quality of life in 
nonconflict countries and reduce it in the case of the conflict 
states. This conclusion must, however, be moderated in light of 
the finding that the agricultural sector in both the conflict and 
nonconflict states may have suffered as a result of increased 
allocations to defense. The food and agriculture sector is the 
mainstay of most African economies, as evidenced by its genera-
tion of employment (67 percent in 1981), its percentage of na-
tional output (40 to 60 percent of GDPs), and its contribution to 
total export eamings.31 Agriculture provides livelihood and 
security for a large majority of Africa's 537 million people. 
Although the contribution of this sector varies from one country 
to another, for the bulk of them agriculture remains the single 
most important generator of overall economic growth and sus-
tained further development. 
TABLE6 
Impact of Military Expenditures on the 
African Quality of Life 
(standardized estimates) 
Human capital factor 
Total country sample 
Human capital = -0.31 GNPPER - 0.44 MILX 
(-2.05) (-2.84) 
r2 = 0.330; F = 6.88; df = 30 
Nonconflict states 
Human capital= 0.15 GNPPER + 0.52 MILX 
(0.48) (2.42) 
r2 = 0.288; F = 3.04; df = 17 
Conflict states 
Human capital= -0.55 GNPPER + 0.13 MILX 
(-1.52) (0.36) 
r2=0.224;F=1.43; di= 12 
Public expenditure per capita factor 
Total country sample 
Public expenditure= 0.02 GNPPER + 0.87 MILX 
(0.62) (9.36) 
r2 = 0.764; F = 45.23; di= 30 
Nonconflict states 
Public expenditure= 0.02 GNPPER + 0.87 MILX 
(0.21) (6.97) 
r2 = 0.763; F = 24.25; di= 17 
Conflict states 
Public expenditure= 0.56 GNPPER + 0.25 MILX 
(2.10) (0.94) 
r2 = 0.559;f = 6.36; di= 12 
(Cont'd.) 
TABLE 6 (Cont'd.) 
Nutrition factor 
Total country sample 
Nutrition= 0.21 GNPPER + 0.53 MILX 
(1.38) (3.44) 
r2 = 0.348; F = 7.50; df = 30 
Nonconflict states 
Nutrition= 0.02 GNPPER + 0.87 MILX 
(0.17) (6.97) 
r2 = 0.763; F = 24.26; df = 17 
Conflict states 
Nutrition = -0.14 GNPPER + 0.28 MILX 
(-0.35) (0.12) 
r2 = 0.051; F = 0.27; df = 12 
Opportunities for women, professionals per capita factor 
Total country sample 
Opportunities, professionals= -0.31 GNPPER + 0.40 MILX 
(1.96) (2.54) 
r2 = 0.293; F = 5.78; df = 30 
Nonconflict states 
Opportunities, professionals = -0.44 GNPPER - 0.49 MILX 
(-2.27) (-2.49) 
r2 = 0.429; F = 5.62; df = 17 
Conflict states 
Opportunities, professionals= 0.14 GNPPER + 0.77 MILX 
(0.40) (0.28) 
r2 = 0.156; F = 0.93; df = 12 
Notes: GNPPER = Gross national product per capita, 1981 ; MILX = share of military expenditure 
in gross national product. r2 =coefficient of determination; F = F statistic; ( ) t statistic; di= degrees 
of freedom. 
TABLE 7 
Africa: Defense-Budgetary Trade-offs, Total Sample 
(standardized coefficients) 
Independent variables Statistics 
Budgetary item GNP PER PCB DEFENSE r2 F df 
DEBT' 
Public services 
General services -0.13 0.87 
(-1.01) (6.79) 0.736 22.34 30 
Education -0.28 0.71 
(-1.87) (4.69) 0.689 15.35 30 
Health -0.27 0.78 
(-2.11) (6.14) 0.783 25.31 30 
Social security 0.26 0.78 
(2.11) (6.26) 0.759 25.26 30 
Housing -0.49* -0.18 
(-2.18) (-0.79) 0.233 2.44 30 
Other social -0.30 0.37 
(-1.29) (1.58) 0.216 2.67 30 
Economic services 
Total economic -0.39* -0.50 
(-1.87) (-2.34) 0.319 3.74 30 
Agriculture -0.36 -0.47 
(-1.85) (-2.38) 0.411 5.57 30 
Roads -0.15* 0.73 
(-0.95) (4.61) 0.611 12.51 30 
Other transport -0.36 0.76 
(-3.36) (7.06) 0.844 37.85 30 
Other economic -0.19 -0.53 
~ (-0.82) (-2.27) 0.273 2.62 30 
Notes: GNPPER = per capita GNP, PCB = the share of public consumption in gross domestic 
product; DEBT= the share of public external debt in GDP. Both the budgetary item and DEFENSE 
are measured as shares of the total central government budget.• indicates DEBT was the control 
variable. 
TABLES 
Africa: Defense-Budgetary Trade-offs, Nonconflict States 
(standardized coefficients) 
Independent variables Statistics 
Budgetary item GNP PER PCB DEFENSE r2 F di 
DEBr 
Public services 
General services 0.20' 1.04 
(1.22) (6.33) 0.862 16.59 17 
Education -0.39 0.62 
(-2.62) (4.20) 0.903 42.00 17 
Health -0.38 0.65 
(-2.71) (4.61) 0.915 48.61 17 
Social security 0.27 0.85 
(2.28) (7.15) 0.875 31.68 17 
Housing -0.01 -0.13 
(-0.03) (-0.38) 0.017 0.08 17 
Other social -0.11 0.47 
(-0.39) (1.78) 0.218 2.85 17 
Economic services 
Total economic -0.26 -0.30 
(-0.86) (-1.11) 0.542 3.16 17 
Agriculture -0.47' -0.83 
(-1.65) (-2.90) 0.484 4.23 17 
Roads -0.28 1.03 
(-1.85) (5.77) 0.834 13.41 17 
Other transport -0.07 0.90 
(-0.44) (5.90) 0.796 17.55 17 
Other economic 0.24 -0.55 
(0.88) (-1.99) 0.322 2.14 17 
Notes: GNPPER =per capita GNP, PCB= the share of public consumption in gross domestic 
product; DEBT= the share of public external debt in GDP. Both the budgetary item and DEFENSE 
are measured as shares of the total central government budget. • indicates DEBT was the control 
variable. 
TABLE9 
Africa: Defense-Budgetary Trade-offs, Conflict States 
(standardized coefficients) 
Independent variables Statistics 
Budgetary item GNP PER PCB DEFENSE r2 F df 
DEBT* 
Public services 
General services 1.14 -0.73 
(5.03) (-2.62) 0.970 34.20 12 
Education 0.80 -1.07 
(3.20) (-4.61) 0.990 36.17 12 
Health 0.78 -0.76 
(-2.71) (-2.66) 0.615 18.61 12 
Social security 0.52' 0.18 
(1.11) (1.42) 0.501 4.01 12 
Housing -1.25 0.98 
(-2.71) (2.10) 0.788 6.71 12 
Other social 0.72 -0.56 
(2.36) (-1.83) 0.643 4.71 12 
Economic services 
Total economic 0.76 -0.80 
(4.96) (-5.21) 0.912 20.69 12 
Agriculture -0.54 -0.68 
(-1.74) (-2.49) 0.750 4.89 12 
Roads 0.79 -0.57 
(2.90) (-2.11) 0.723 5.22 12 
Other transport 0.71 -0.39 
(2.37) (-1.22) 0.761 5.19 12 
Other economic 0.41 -0.64 
(1.08) (-2.76) 0.553 4.66 12 
Notes: GNPPER = per capita GNP, PCB = the share of public consumption in gross domestic 
product; DEBT= the share of public external debt in GDP. Both the budgetary item and DEFENSE 
are measured as shares of the total central government budget.• indicates DEBT was the control 
variable. 
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Yet, despite this predominant role, food and agriculture 
output has been in decline since the 1960s. Chronic food insecu-
rity, mounting food import bills, serious dietary deficiencies, and 
stagnating agricultural exports plague the continent. The causes 
of the decline of Africa's agricultural sector are numerous and 
include:32 (1) urban-biased development that has turned the 
terms of trade against the agricultural sector, (2) export-oriented 
strategies, (3) technological dependence, (4) scarcity of trained 
manpower, and (5) a largely unknown resource base. 
Given the likely strength of these factors in contributing to 
the sector's decline, increased defense expenditures (and the as-
sociated reduction in public sector allocations to the agricultural 
sector) may only contribute marginally to the sector's demise. 
Clearly, more research will be needed before it will be possible to 
assess the relative contribution of defense expenditures to the 
stagnation of Africa's agricultural sector. Some insights can be 
obtained, however, from an examination of the differential macro-
economic impact of defense expenditures in the conflict and 
nonconflict states; that is, it may be that defense expenditures in 
nonconflict states interact on key economic variables to offset 
somewhat their negative impact on the agricultural sector. 
For example, it is rather unlikely that the conflict states 
would be able, due to hesitancy on the part of the suppliers or 
capital markets to provide funds, to supplement their domestic 
resources by fairly large volumes of external loans to finance 
military expenditures. Instead, military expenditures in these 
countries would have to come from bidding resources away 
from other activities. The nonconflict countries, on the other 
hand, might, through use of external funds due to their higher 
credit-worthiness, be able to expand military expenditures with-
out diverting a large volume of resources away from other 
activities. 
To test this hypothesis, military expenditures were regressed 
on gross domestic product (GDPB), the public external debt 
(PDB), and debt service payments (DSGB). The results were: 
N onconflict states: 
(1) ME = -0.02 GDPB + 1.26 PDB - 0.39 DSGB 
(-0.32) (12.1'9) (-4.90) 
r2 = 0.963; F = 132.40; df = 17 
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Conflict states: 
(2) ME = 1.00 GDPB - 0.02 PDB - O.Ol DSGB 
(11.32) (-0.30) (-0.24) 
r2 = 0.970; F = 87.08; df = 12 
Where ME = total military expenditures, 1981; GDPB = 
gross domestic product, 1981; PDB =total external public 
debt, 1981;DSGB=publicextemaldebtserviceasapercent-
age of GDP 1981. 
95 
The contrast between the two groups is striking. Clearly, the 
nonconflict states have relied largely on external public debt to 
facilitate their military expenditures. The negative sign on the 
debt service term may indicate that debt servicing to maintain 
credit-worthiness is given a high priority by these countries and 
that any conflicts between making debt service payments and 
military expenditures are resolved in favor of debt servicing. The 
conflict countries, on the other hand, have not been able to draw 
extensively on foreign resources to facilitate their military build-
ups. As the budgetary analysis indicated, they have been forced 
to live largely within their domestic resources, with added de-
fense expenditures apparently coming at the expense of other 
allocations. 
Another area in which we should find substantial differ-
ences between the conflict and nonconflict states lies in the 
factors that determine arms imports. We should expect less of a 
pressing need among the nonconflict countries to spend scarce 
foreign exchange on arms imports-undoubtedly this group of 
countries is in a position to postpone new acquisitions during 
periods of foreign exchange scarcity, whereas the conflict coun-
tries may feel such a pressing need (real or imagined) for new 
weapons that orders are placed quite independently of the over-
all state of the economy. To test this proposition, arms imports 
were regressed on the level of gross foreign exchange reserves of 
the country (reflecting ability to finance imports) and total mili-
tary expenditures (reflecting need for new weapons). The results 
were as follows: 
Conflict states: 
(3) AI= 1.0l GIRB + 0.10 PDB - 0.17 ME 
(23.61) (0.83) (-1.34) • 
r2 = 0.976; F = 204.11; df = 12 
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Nonconflict states: 
(4) AI = -0.94 GIRB + 0.12 PDB + 1.71 ME 
(-1.44) (0.62) (2.55) 
r2 = 0.833; F = 13.33; df = 17 
Where AI= arms imports, 1981; GIRB =gross international 
reserves, 1981; PDB =public external debt, 1981; ME= total 
military expenditures, 1981. 
Again, sharp contrasts exist between the nonconflict and 
conflict states of Africa. Arms imports in the nonconflict states 
are largely related to overall foreign exchange reserves (there is 
almost a one-to-one pattern). Presumably, for these countries 
during periods of foreign exchange scarcity, arms imports are 
correspondingly reduced and vice versa. This interpretation is 
quite consistent with the insignificance of military expenditure 
(ME) affecting this group's level of arms imports. Again, because 
of the apparent luxury these countries have in postponing arms 
imports until economic conditions are favorable, large amounts 
of scarce foreign exchange are not diverted from productive uses 
to finance arms imports. 
The conflict countries' arms imports, on the other hand, are 
not related to their ability to pay for them. Instead, they appar-
ently reflect immediate military need as reflected by their posi-
tive and statistically significant association with total military 
expenditures. Again, military build-ups in these countries do not 
appear to be related to good economic conditions with the result 
that sacrifices are likely to be inflicted to finance stepped-up 
levels of defense expenditures. 
If this interpretation is correct, we would also expect the 
overall determinants of external public debt to vary considerably 
between conflict and nonconflict countries with the nonconflict 
countries likely to be more credit-worthy and have more flexibil-
ity in financing military expenditures with external debt if nec-
essary to minimize strains on the domestic economy. The model 
tested assumed public external debt to be directly related to the 
resources of the country (GDPB) (a need for finance), the level of 
gross domestic reserves (GIRB) (another reflection of the need for 
external finance-the higher the level of resources the less the 
need for additional external funds). militarv exoenditures CME). 
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and exports (MTEA) (a measure of credit-worthiness). The re-
sults were: 
Nonconflict states: 
(5) PDB = 0.03 GDPB - 1.89 GIRB + 0.68 ME + 2.00 MTEA 
(0.31) (-4.10) (2.52) (3.99) 
r2 = 0.954; F = 67.40; df = 17 
Conflict states: 
(6) PDB = 3.20 GDPB + 0.52 GIRB - 0.05 ME - 2.98 MTEA 
(1.57) (0.37) (-0.03) (-1.36) 
r2 = 0.644; F = 2.71; df = 12 
Where PDB =public external debt, 1981; GDPB =gross 
domestic product, 1981; ME = average military expendi-
ture, 1970-1981; MTEA =average level of exports, 1970-
1981. 
The nonconflict countries, therefore, have borrowed exter-
nally to augment local resources in expanding military expendi-
tures. They have borrowed against relatively good export per-
formance, and have used added gross domestic resources to 
reduce their debt burden. The conflict countries, on the other 
hand, show no statistically significant pattern. They have not 
been able to improve their credit-worthiness through improved 
export performance nor has their external public debt been 
managed to reflect changes in the foreign reserves. Again, since 
these countries have apparently not used external resources to 
finance a large amount of their military expenditures, these 
allocations have undoubtedly come at the expense of other 
domestic socioeconomic allocations. 
Along these same lines, we would expect to find the impact 
of military expenditures on such macro-aggregates as invest-
ment to vary considerably between conflict and nonconflict 
countries. The model tested links the rate of investment to the 
savings rate, resource inflows (the resource balance), public 
external debt, and the military burden. The results are: 
Nonconflict states: 
(7) GDIB = 0.63 MS - 0.36 RBB + 0.35 MEY + 0.68 PDPB 
(3.47) (-2.20) (2.04) • (1.68) 
r2 = 0.695; F = 7.41; df = 17 
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Conflict states: 
(8) GDIB = 0.53 MS - 0.39 RBB + 0.19 MEY + 0.51 PDPB 
(1.85) (-1.28) (0.69) (1.71) 
r2 = 0.69; F = 2.79; df =12 
Where GDIB =share of investment in GDP, 1981; MS= 
average marginal savings rate, 1970-1981; MEY= military 
expenditure share in GNP, 1981; RRB =resource balance 
shareinGDP, 1981;PDPB=publicextemaldebtaspercent-
age of GDP, 1981. 
While not negative, the military burden has not stimulated 
investment in the conflict countries. On the other hand, increases 
in the military burden are statistically significant and positively 
linked with increases in the share of resources allocated to invest-
ment. This pattern may have developed as a result of either 
positive spin-offs associated with military expenditures in the 
conflict countries or the tendency of military expenditures to 
augment (as shown in the factor-quality of life analysis) the 
amount of supporting resources, thus increasing the overall 
profitability of investment. 
A proxy for the profitability of investment is the capital 
output ratio. Here the capital output ratio is defined as the rate of 
growth in investment (1970-1981) divided by the growth in GDP 
(1970-1981). The capital output ratio is assumed to be linked to 
public external debt (reflecting technology imports) and the 
overall growth in the economy (presumably high growth rates 
causing bottlenecks that reduce the productivity of capital). The 
results are: 
N onconflict states: 
(9) ICOR = 0.48 PDB - 0.41 PDPB - 0.48 MEP - 0.52 GDPGB 
(1.03) (-1.74) (-2.07) (-2.10) 
r2 = 0.391; F = 2.09; df = 17 
Conflict states: 
(10) ICOR- 0.71 PDB-0.65 PDPB + 0.82 MEP + 0.42 GDPGB 
(-3.57) (-3.17) (3.79) (2.16) 
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Where ICOR =rate of growth in investment, 1970-1981, 
divided by the rate of growth in GDP, 1970-1981; PDB = 
external public debt, 1981; PDPB = public external debt as 
a share of GDP, 1981; MEP =average military expenditure 
per capita, 1970-1981; GDPGB =growth in real GDP, 1970-
1981. 
99 
Again, military expenditures impact in divergent ways in 
the two groups of countries. In the nonconflict countries they 
tend to increase the productivity of capital (reduce the capital 
output ratio), whereas in the conflict countries additional mili-
tary expenditures have tended to reduce the productivity of 
capital (increase the capital output ratio). 
Of related interest is the fact that higher growth rates in the 
nonconflict countries have tended to increase the productivity of 
investment (perhaps through fuller capacity utilization). Con-
flict countries have experienced reductions in the productivity of 
investment at higher growth rates, indicating perhaps the pres-
ence of bottlenecks created by too great a strain on local re-
sources. 
CONCLUSION 
The empirical results presented demonstrate the futility of at-
tempting to generalize about the costs of military expenditures in 
the Third World. Clearly, the old guns vs. butter type of analysis 
is not universally valid. In fact, this dichotomy may be extremely 
misleading for a fairly large group of countries. On the other 
hand, it is quite apparent that for many of the African countries, 
the defense build-up in the 1970s and early 1980s was a major 
cause of their economic demise. 
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